T his Memoir is divided into three parts. Part I describes Brouwer's life and that part of his work which develops a general philosophy of mathematics; since the latter is regarded as obscure, but also as important, its broad out lines are presented quite fully and without technicalities. Parts II and III contain more precise accounts of Brouwer's contributions to topology and logic respectively; Parts I and III are due to G. Kreisel, Part II to M. H. A. Newman.
University of Amsterdam, and was in close contact with the philosopher, Mannoury, for whom he retained a life-long affection (100b). Brouwer's dissertation was accepted by the applied mathematician, B. J. Korteweg, who worked on surface waves and, in collaboration with van der Waals, on molecular forces. The dissertation did not contain any results, but rather Brouwer's views on what was important in mathematics, and polemics against then current set theoretic foundations. In short, the work was 'immature' for someone of his age, but full of drive. Hindsight shows that, in Brouwer's case, the style of the work could also be interpreted as the outward sign of an exceptionally prolonged and vigorous intellectual development, which was soon to bear fruit.
From 1909 to 1912 Brouwer was privaat-docent. In 1912 he was elected to the Chair for set theory, function theory and axiomatics at the University of Amsterdam, which he held till 1951. In view of Brouwer's critical attitude to set theory and axiomatics, the choice of name seems odd; but perhaps in those days one thought of topology as an axiomatic theory and of point set topology as part of set theory. Also in 1912 Brouwer was elected Member of the Dutch Royal Academy of Science. He was knighted in 1932 (Ridder in de Nederlandse Leeuw) and elected a Foreign Member of the Royal Society in 1948.
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Cons true tivity
This was a life-long interest dating from his thesis. A thorough under standing of the matter requires the sort of experience in mathematics which will be assumed in Part III, but it is possible to get a satisfactory general idea without knowing more than Aristotle: the issue goes back to the Greeks. Is mathematics our own construction and about such constructions, or does mathematics discover truths about an abstract reality external to ourselves ?
Much is made of certain obvious ambiguities in the issue. But the real difficulty, as would be expected of old rival alternatives, is that each of them is consistent with familiar facts-at least as long as one does not look at them too closely. Brouwer found a place where the issue becomes manageable, namely in the analysis of the usual logical operations. The considerations are so simple that they are not affected by the ambiguities mentioned. What, from a constructive point of view, do we have to know to assert a proposi tion P? We must give a proof. And to assert the negation of P, we require a refutation of P; it is not enough that, so to speak as a matter of historical accident, we have not so far found a proof of P. Brouwer considered the law of the excluded middle which states that either P or non P, for all propositions P. Now for Brouwer's interpretation of the logical operations we should have reason to assert this law in full generality only if, here and now, we either know how to prove any given P or how to refute P. Brouwer had no difficulty in showing that there was no convincing reason for this assertion. Though for a long time he had no refutation either, he spoke of the 'unreliability' of this law as early as 1908 (67) . However, much later he obtained a refutation (for his interpretation of the logical operations) after the theory of constructivity was developed to include propositions about sufficiently 'sophisticated' concepts.
Brouwer himself did not stress the fact that a new interpretation of the logical operations was involved. He rejected the more usual 'truth func tional' interpretation because he rejected the conception of mathematics which suggested the latter. This is the critical, so to speak, 'negative' and best-known side of his work. In this Memoir the positive side will be stressed; the extent to which a coherent and sophisticated, if problematic, area of mathematics can be developed from the notions of proof and rule (construc tion). Brouwer's own doctrinaire presentation was not only philosophically dubious but practically unsuccessful because it did not really convey his views. It is, however, highly likely that, at an early stage, his own work benefited greatly from two very usual consequences of any doctrinaire position. He was able to develop his ideas vigorously, first because he had put out of his mind all but the matter in h an d ; and second because weak nesses of a position are less 'disturbing' if (one thinks) there is no alternative. As we shall see, things were different twenty years later.
Topology
Soon after his thesis, Brouwer published an outstanding series of papers in topology, a subject which deals with the most basic properties of geo metric figures or, as the later Brouwer would have had to say, of visual perception. The work is described in Part II, but here it is pertinent to note a link with constructivity. Brouwer, like most of his contemporaries, used as a tool approximations by geometric figures which are determined by a finite number of points: polygons in the plane, polyhedra in space. But unlike most of them, except for example Poincare, another constructivist, his use of those figures was very elementary; or 'algebraic' as we should say now. In his style of work one never thinks of a line or surface as made up of an infinite number of points in contrast to point set topology.
Inevitably one wonders about the heuristic value of Brouwer's (or Poincare's) general logical ideas for his topology and, on a higher level, about the value of his general philosophical ideas for his logic. (In a few philosophical papers on knowledge and its origins Brouwer elaborated on the primacy of the will over the intellect.) Now his logical ideas which he published several years before his topological work, were not only novel, but almost detailed enough to deduce rigorously some of his topological innovations from them, though he himself had not done so explicitly. In contrast his philosophical views, though quite consistent with his logic (his stress on the will corresponding to his interest in constructions, in what we do ourselves) were undeveloped and, literally, commonplace: the observer, language and linguistic conventions had a big role in the episte mology of the time. O f course it can happen that general philosophical views need only be formulated to be useful. But this is doubtful in the case of the epistemological ideas above when we compare Einstein's fruitful use of them in relativity theory with Poincare's sterile conventionalism in geometry.
Biographical Memoirs
Intuitionism and, formalism (cf. the title of (71)) Brouwer's intuitionistic mathematics, as he called it, treats propositions, rules and proofs as objects of thought, more or less as they present them selves to us naively. These objects are represented, for instance, for the pur pose of communication, by finite concrete signs such as words or symbols. The formalist conception of mathematics holds that all mathematically significant relations involving proofs and propositions can be adequately analysed in terms of their representations; of course, the properties of signs to be used here must be external or formal, they must refer only to mechanical manipulations of signs, not to their meaning. In short, formalism is a parti cular mechanistic theory of reasoning. Formalist reasoning about manipu lations with finite strings of symbols has the same elementary combinatorial character as that used in topological manipulations of finite configurations of points. Quite generally, most familiar mathematics which is constructive at all, turns out to be combinatorial; it does not use constructions on abstract, typically intuitionistic objects such as proofs or rules. For this reason it is practically easy enough to recognize elementary arguments as such when we see them. But people differ on what is essential to this elementary charac ter : the words combinatorial and finitist correspond to the two most important views on the matter. (Of course, reasoning about manipulations with strings of symbols must be distinguished from the manipulations themselves which do not involve mathematical reasoning, properly speaking, at all; at best such formal manipulations are concrete representations of reasoning.)
Development of constructive mathematics
Even during the period of his topological discoveries, Brouwer thought about a constructive reworking of mathematics and reported some results in (71) . In accordance with the last paragraph, Brouwer's specific logical ideas do not yet come into play and his results can be quite adequately stated in perfectly straightforward terms: he decides alternatives which had been previously left undecided or gives additional conditions which allow a decision.
The publications of 1918-1928 changed all this. For currently popular ideas, Brouwer's most striking innovation was his conception of proofs as infinite objects. The idea is not far fetched, particularly if the statements proved are about infinitely many instances, for instance in justifying the principle of induction in arithmetic. On the contrary, the opposite, that is the forma list conception mentioned above, is 'daring', in that it assumes that the basic properties of our (mathematical) thoughts can be intelligibly analysed in terms of the signs we use to represent these thoughts. But Brouwer went beyond mere plausibility and discovered an area where his ideas of infinite proofs led (him) to striking formal laws: the analysis of constructive opera tions on arbitrary sequences of natural numbers. O f course, there are such operations, for instance the rule which associates with any sequence at, a2, a3 . . . its first element ax. Brouwer's aim was to analyse all possibilities of proving constructively that an operation is well-defined on arbitrary sequences. He came up with his bar theorem and a corollary which he liked to formulate as a startling 'theorem': all functions of real numbers in the unit interval are uniformly continuous. By use of propositions about arbi trary sequences he was also able to refute the law of the excluded middle mentioned earlier. The mathematical reader will find more details, in particular a sober reformulation, in Part III.
Brouwer's controversy with Hilbert
About the turn of the century the mathematician, Hilbert, Brouwer's senior by twenty years, began his pursuit of formalist foundations (Hilbert 1904) . He formulated his famous programme stating adequacy conditions on such a foundation which will be gone into in Part III. The well-known con troversy between Hilbert and Brouwer was, contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, an internal schism among constructivists, since Hilbert, too, adopted a constructive view of mathematical reasoning; in fact his was stricter than Brouwer's, since he wanted to reduce mathematics to principles that were not only constructive but jinitist. One difference between Hilbert and Brouwer was that Brouwer certainly regarded the finitist restriction as unnecessary for constructive foundations and, probably, as difficult to formulate in a precise and convincing fashion. But the principal difference was in their attitude towards ordinary, non-constructive mathematical practice. Brouwer proposed to ignore this practice except at best as an heuristic guide. Hilbert, in his programme, proposed to establish its coherence by means of his finitist methods, and generally, use it as a tool for getting finitist results.
Hilbert's ideas had great appeal for mathematicians and attracted the active collaboration of several gifted people, especially in the twenties. One reason was the truly childlike simplicity of Hilbert's programme, another was his straightforward and direct presentation. Brouwer, as we saw above, certainly succeeded in startling the mathematical world, by alienation in the jargon of the theatre. In this connexion he quoted often, and with evident approval, George Bernard Shaw's advice to the effect that one has to exaggerate to make an impression. (A pedant might have pointed out that G.B.S. never promised a favourable impression.) But, objectively, it seems fair to say that Brouwer was right on almost every major issue on which he disagreed with Hilbert.
The half-century mark Just as Brouwer was turning fifty, articles by Hey ting and Godel appeared which, though they did not, objectively, create new problems for Brouwer's work in logic, must have been equally disturbing; one in an obvious, the other in a subtler way (Heyting 1930; Godel 1931) .
Heyting is best known for an elegant set of formal laws (Heyting 1930 ) which are valid for Brouwer's constructive interpretation of the logical operations. Outsiders were excited by these simple laws which suggested algebraic and other mathematical manipulations, without too much thought whether such work produced misunderstanding or understanding of Brouwer's intentions. (Heyting's laws concerned only elementary logic, a small part of intuitionistic mathematics; like any other severely limited set of facts these laws admit a great number of quite distinct interpretations, some of which are totally removed from Brouwer's ideas.) Heyting himself warned against the possibilities of such misunderstandings in the clearest possible terms. But he did much m ore: he formulated the intended interpretation in the natural way, in terms of the concepts of proof and rule. Now the formal laws are not immediately evident if one restricts oneself to some simple list of proofs and rules such as those represented in familiar formal systems. W hat is needed are the general abstract concepts of (constructive) proof and of rule, including, for instance, rules which associate proofs to proofs or to rules. Brouwer himself had never set out anything like Heyting's analysis. Though one may have been uncomfortable about some of Brouwer's informal explana tions, this malaise was, psychologically, far less alarming than seeing in full detail what difficult abstract notions are involved in the very meaning of the logical operations. Brouwer's doctrinaire polemics against alternative foundational schemes had a hollow ring.
Godel's famous work on the 'incompleteness' of formal systems established, roughly speaking, the inadequacy of Hilbert's formalist foundations; or, more precisely, it refuted some of Hilbert's specific assumptions behind the programme. Since Brouwer had denied these assumptions, one might simplemindedly expect him to have been gratified by Godel's results. But both the nature of Godel's argument and Brouwer's conduct during the decade following Godel's paper give one reason to doubt this simple-minded inter pretation.
Godel's immensely natural proofs did not need anything like the heavy distinctions which Brouwer thought essential to his development of construc tive mathematics (nor, incidentally, the ingenious constructions that Hilbert had introduced into proof theory). W hat they did involve was a clear perception of aims and principles, a philosophical, non-doctrinaire analysis, alien to the logical activists of the time. Seeing the incomparable superiority of this kind of analysis Brouwer had to face the question, consciously or unconsciously, to what extent he had even begun to master his own logical ideas. Actually the same question may well have paralysed the formalist camp too, who did not draw the natural consequence from Godel's work either: all they had to do was to reformulate Hilbert's programme more carefully in the light of Godel's result to open up new lines of research.
Be that as it may, it is a fact that Brouwer himself devoted the ten years after publication of the papers by Heyting and Godel to non-scientific activities, although, objectively, these papers concerned essential points of his life's work-and although he was only fifty and in good health. It does not seem unreasonable to suppose that he had received an intellectual shock.
Perhaps a biographical study of this remarkable man will bring light on this matter, when the details of his life in the thirties have been sorted out. The anecdotes about this period are fragmentary and even contradictory; but Brouwer's views on Life expressed in (121) may help to interpret this scattered information. Since, by general agreement, Brouwer was selfwilled and impulsive, the views of his youth are probably a valid guide to his later personality; just as the views in his dissertation (65), another 'immature' work, are certainly a good guide to his later scientific interests.
Solipsism
In his sixties Brouwer took up a side of the constructive philosophy of mathematics which had not previously played any explicit role in his work: the 'thinking subject' as Brouwer put it (or the 'ideal mathematician', as he will be called in Part III). To emphasize this aspect, Brouwer began to call himself an introspective psychologist because, he thought, this term described the mathematician's proper task. Moreover, he dismissed the role of communication between mathematicians, comparing other people to vacuum cleaners (a phrase which suggests that Brouwer found contact with other people exhausting).
Applied to mathematical reasoning, the solipsist view is not far-fetched. After all, once our attention has been drawn to certain ideas or methods, understanding them is very much a private matter; we follow proofs and do not merely repeat the words of other people. But does the view affect (constructive) mathematical practice? Brouwer found a positive answer by considering a mathematician who gives himself a rule referring to the stages of his own mathematical activity or, as one says, who employs a 'private' language. From a solipsist view of mathematics such a rule belongs to mathematics because it is as well determined (for him) as any other rule. But from an intersubjective view it does not belong to mathematics because it cannot be communicated, and the possibility of communication is re quired here (in contrast to the solipsist position). W hat is particularly interesting is that Brouwer's considerations lead to consequences that can be formulated in the ordinary language of mathematics, which does not explicitly refer to the mathematician's activity. He found a property R and a 'private' rule which evidently satisfies R, but one does not know any intersubjectively well-determined rule which does; see Part III for details. So once again Brouwer had succeeded in finding a way of making an old distinction, between a solipsist and an intersubjective view of mathematical knowledge, manageable or, at least, held out a promise of doing so. We cannot yet judge the intrinsic interest of his idea; but if it is positive at all, the value of Brouwer's contribution is surely very high when measured by the ratio of its interest to the probability of its discovery.
In his last years Brouwer felt that his contributions were not adequately appreciated. He may have exaggerated a bit; but, by and large, he was probably right. Without, of course, explaining cause and effect, Brouwer's solipsism fits in quite well with his failure to convey his ideas. For, while, as was said above, solipsism seems an excellent first approximation for an analysis of mathematical reasoning, it would not be expected to be equally sound in public relations.
Biographical Memoirs
P a r t II. M a t h e m a t i c a l w o r k
Brouwer's working life was divided very unequally in time between topo logy and the philosophy of mathematics. On topology, which was completely transformed by the impact of his ideas, he spent only the years 1909 to 1913, apart from some slighter papers that appeared soon after the First World War.
Brouwer's interest in topology originated in an exhaustive study of Part II of the Schoenflies Bericht iiber die P u n k t m a n n i g , which had appe in 1908, the first systematic development of plane point-set topology (Schoenflies 1908) . It was through the medium of the ideas and results of this treatise, to which Brouwer frequently expresses his indebtedness, that his early work on transformations of surfaces, including the first version (9b, 1909) of his fixed-point theorem, was expressed. But soon he began to find gaps and errors in the Schoenflies arguments, and finally he was led to under take his own analysis of the structure of plane continua. According to Schoenflies the central idea of plane topology is the 'closed curve', that is a continuum* with two residual (connected) domains, of each of which it is the boundary. The points of the 'curve' accessible from either one of the domains can be given a natural cyclical order, 77, and Brouwer defined as an arc (in this Memoir called a Brouwer arc) the point-set closure of the set of accessible points between two 'sections' of 77 (in the Dedekindian sense). He constructed remarkable examples to show that a 'closed curve' can be , in the sense that it is not the union of two Brouwer arcs distinct from itself, and further, that three or more plane domains can have the same con tinuum as boundary. These examples, which revealed possibilities entirely unsuspected before that time, appeared in an article (14), in Malhematische Annalen devoted wholly to exposing and in many cases making good the errors in the Schoenflies Bericht. Schoenflies took the criticism in good part and paid a handsome tribute to Brouwer's work in the second edition of his 'Part I ', when it appeared in 1913.
The second theme of Brouwer's earlier work was an attack on the 2-dimensional case of Hilbert's 'Fifth Problem', propounded at the Paris International Congress of Mathematicians in 1900: 'how far is the concept of the Lie continuous transformation-group adequate for our investiga tions without the assumption of differentiability?' Brouwer prepared the way by a series of papers on transformations of surfaces, culminating in his Translation Theorem, which is considered below in its later and more satisfactory form. His analysis of the plane continuous groups was not completed, a promised third communication never having appeared, but the transformation-groups of the line (8, 1909) and all plane transformation groups with no more than two parameters (8, 1910) were found.
This was a fine achievement, the first application of deep topological arguments to a problem outside the subject, except perhaps for some of Hilbert's work in connexion with the foundations of geometry (Hilbert 1902) . It is all the more a pity that the two papers, and those leading up to them, are made almost unreadable by the nature of the arguments. In the hands of Schoenflies these pure geometrical 'point-set' methods produced arguments not too difficult for well-disposed readers to follow. Used by someone who knew all the pitfalls and was determined to assume nothing that was not proved they led to arguments too long and too complicated for human consumption. The difficulty is increased by Brouwer's readiness to quote results from Schoenflies, of the truth of which he had no doubt convinced himself, perhaps by other methods, but which look uncomfortably like those that he had criticized. Friedrich Engel, the collaborator of Lie, who had the task of reviewing the papers on continuous groups for Fortschritte der Mathematik (Engel 1910) confesses to the 'horror' inspired by contemplation of these proofs:
'Im allgemeinen kann ich nicht verhehlen, dass mir bei der ungeheuren Allgemeinheit der Untersuchung und bei der Mannigfaltigkeit der erforderlichen Schliisse ein gelindes Grauen ankommt. Ich kann mir wirklich nicht dehken, dass gleich auf den ersten Anhieb alles ins Reine gebracht worden sein sollte.' Brouwer himself was for the most part protected against error by his insight into the pathology of plane continua, though once an important result (the original Translation Theorem) based on a wrong result of Schoenflies had to be replaced by a new proof of a more restricted theorem.
Finally it seems that his own counter-examples and a few such false steps convinced him that bare hands are not enough in this rough territory. He began quite suddenly to use new methods of polyhedral approximation which in many cases enable the complications of the point-set structure to be entirely kept out of the argument. The paper (15) on Jordan's Theorem* which marks the change, opens with these words (here translated):
'The proof which M. Jordan gave of his fundamental theorem on curves operates with sequences of polygons converging to the curve, a method retained in all published proofs known to me that are neither incorrect nor confined to special cases, up to that of Veblen. He first gave a proof * Every simple closed curve in the plane determines two residual domains, of each of which it is the boundary.
which, instead of treating the curve as a limit of polygons, considers the curve itself directly, and obtains the result by using its inner properties. We shall proceed in this direct way in what follows, but by an entirely different and, as I believe, much shorter route. ' The 'inner property' used by Brouwer is the division of the curve into two arcs by any two of its points. It is exploited in the lemma, proved simply and directly in the paper, that n disjoint polygonal arcs joining two disjoint continua, Ki and K2, and lying in in its boundary, divide D into n domains.
The striking contrast between the mathematical style of this paper and that of its predecessors may be illustrated by the argument used to prove that there are at least two domains in the case = 2 of this lemma. If D were not disconnected by the two arcs Wt and w2 there would be a polygonal arc running in D from one bank of w2 to the other without meeting w2, and this arc, with a sub-arc of w2, would form a simple polygon separating the two ends of w2, and therefore separating from K 2 but not meeting Wi. This is impossible since w i joins K Even the style of writing seems markedly simpler. This famous paper, which occupies only six pages of the Annalen, can be read today with ease and pleasure.
It was at this time that, moving into n dimensions, Brouwer had the richest in consequences of all his topological ideas, that a map of one manifold into another can be usefully approximated by a simplicial map (linear in each simplex) which need not faithfully imitate the original map. Even if the original map is a homeomorphism, singularities may be permitted in the approximating map. By applying this entirely original idea to define the degree of a map of a compact orientable manifold into a manifold he opened up for the first time the possibility of a rigorous topology of manifolds of arbitrary dimension. The use of the degree led naturally to the consideration of maps that are not (1,1) and, since the degree is not changed in a homotopy, to the consideration of homotopy classes of maps, the central theme of algebraic topology for many years afterwards.
Within little more than a year after this discovery he published a series of papers which has become the foundation of the theory, both geometrical and algebraic, of combinatorial manifolds. The proper choice of the defini tion of these objects (21, 1912) itself required an almost prophetic insight into the difficulties of n-dimensional topology. For progress to be made at that time it was necessary to assume, as part of the definition, not only that the manifolds can be 'triangulated' (divided up into simplicial com plexes) but also that this can be done so that the simplexes at each vertex are arranged like those of a star of rectilinear simplexes filling a neigh bourhood of a point in Rn (Euclidean n-space). It is only in the year, 1969, in which this Memoir is written that the question whether these extra pro perties follow necessarily from the assumption that the space is a topological manifold (a locally Euclidean metrisable space) has been answered (in the negative (Kirby and Siebenmann 1969) .
The general idea of his definition of the degree (21, 1912 ) may be illus trated by the case where the dimensions of the two manifolds are the same. Since Brouwer never hit upon the method later found by J. W. Alexander of approximating simultaneously the whole of a map / :
-> he made ingenious use of the fact that the degree is constant over and therefore determined by its value over any open subset. If M i is sufficiently finely subdivided the simplexes, r, of M i that are mapped into t simplex o of M z include all those that meet a given smaller concentric simplex crx. In these simplexes, r, l e t / b e replaced by a linear map, while at the same time the vertex-images are slightly shifted to avoid singular image-simplexes and other accidents. A sign, plus or minus, can now be assigned in a natural way to the g-image of each principal simplex r, and the degree of ga t a general point p of a2 defined as the algebraic number of image-simplexes covering p. It is a simple matter to prove that this degree is constant in al9 and is the same for all the various choices involved (e.g. of the simplex a). The common value is by definition d(f). The constancy of d ( f ) over M 2 makes it simple also to prove invariance under homotopy since the homotopy can be resolved into steps in w h ic h /is changed in one simplex of M 2 while it is held fixed in another.
In this same paper the degree was used to prove that if n is even every vector distribution on the w-sphere, S" , has a singula theorems on fixed-points of maps, no longer required to be (1,1), to the w-sphere and closed n-cell. The new proofs of the fixed-point theorems must have appeared unbelievably short to those who knew Brouwer's earlier proof for the 2-sphere. Indeed, suppose / : -> has no fixed point, and let a: S'1 Sn be the antipodal map. Then ) and x are not anti podal, and so are for each x joined by a unique shortest path on the sphere. Hence, a f is homotopic to the identity by moving each point along its path uniformly in 1 second. It follows that
Therefore unless is (-l)"-1 , / h a s a fixed point.
Finally it was proved as a lemma in this paper that the complement of a closed topological w-cell in Rn is connected.
In other rapidly following papers he proved by the new methods the invariance of open sets, first in (22, 1912) then much simplified in (29, 1912) ; the first part ('at most two domains') of the ^-dimensional Jordan's Theorem (23, 1912) ; and that every point of a compact orientable ( -l)-manifold in Rn is accessible from the residual domains, which he showed are (in modern terms) uniformly locally connected (in dimension 0) (24, 1912) .
A paper of the n-dimensional series, which appeared in Journal (33, 1913) , had a different purpose: to give precise form to a suggestion of Poincare, that the dimension of a set X should be defined inductively by some such property as '
Xc an be separated into 2 or mo ( n -1)-dimensional, but not by an (n -2)-dimensional subset'. This is clearly not to be taken literally (as Brouwer pointed out) since it would make any (double) cone in Rn 1-dimensional. He substituted: a connected space has dimension-grade < ni f every pair of disjoint clos be separated by a closed set of dimension-grade ^ -1. ' grade 0' is to mean that no two points are connected by a continuum. Finally, the dimension-grade at a point P is the least dimension-grade of a closed neighbourhood of P. The purpose of the paper is to prove the 'justi fying theorem': Euclidean n-space has dimension-grade n at every point.
The central point of the proof is a Lemma that had been stated and used by Lebesgue (Lebesgue 1911). It is of interest from its connexion with the first paper of Brouwer on w-dimensional topology (18) , on the invariance of Euclidean dimension, in which he made use of the degree without naming it or defining it in general. That paper was found strange by contemporaries and excessively brief (as perhaps it was). Lebesgue, who had heard of the paper from Blumenthal, was moved to send in as a simpler proof his famous 'Pavement Theorem': if e > 0 and a is an there is a finite closed e-covering of a of order ^ n -f-1 (i.e. no point of a is in more than + 1 sets); b is not true i f ' o r d e r^ rd replaces ' 'order ^.n + T. This obviously provides a alternative proof of the invariance of Euclidean dimension. The Lebesgue note was printed in Mathematische Annalen immediately after Brouwer's paper, but it depended on the Lemma referred to above, of which, as Brouwer pointed out, the proof given was not correct. He now gave a short and elegant proof, depending once more on the degree of a map. He thus proved not only his theorem justifying the dimension-grade, but the Lebesgue Pavement Theorem. This theorem, here proved for the first time, provides the basis for a definition of the dimension of topological spaces which has been found more convenient in use than Brouwer's 'dimension-grade', based on Poincare's notion, and it is in fact the most important outcome of the paper.
A remarkable paper on n-dimensional topology, which was less fully worked out than any of the preceding series, was the paper (32, 1912) on looping coefficients. He first defined the looping coefficient of disjoint com pact orientable manifolds, AT and K 2, i n o n -h -1, to be the degree of the map, fof the a into the positively oriented unit sphere A"-1 in Rn (centre ), defined by mapping x X yo n to />,where op is the parallel vector at o to xy. By tak simplicial approximations to A'i and K2 in Rn, and moving them into general position he showed in outline that this looping coefficient is equal to the algebraic number of intersections of with an --chain, , bounded by K2. He remarked that this could be made the basis of a definition and justified the remark by a direct argument to show that the number is unchanged by choosing a different simplicial approximation, or another ' . This is precisely the definition, and essentially the argument, adopted by Lefschetz fourteen years later (Lefschetz 1930, p. 206) , when details of the sketch were for the first time filled in.
The paper remained isolated, perhaps because of Brouwer's reluctance to become involved with Poincare's homology theory, which at that time had no rigorous foundation. Indeed this paper is the only step towards such a foundation before Alexander's invariance proof of 1916, but lacked the necessary algebraic basis.
Not As Brouwer himself pointed out, it is not true that the iterated images, T nF (-oo < n < oo) of a single translation-field need cover the whole plane (Kerekjarto 1923, p. 195 , gives an example). It cannot therefore be inferred that
Ti s a translation in the ordinary sense, i.e. becomes a map (xi) -> (xx + fli) by a change of coordinates.
The proof is still constructed out of properties of simple arcs and simple closed curves, without polygonal approximation, but it is far simpler than the old one, and can be read today by a determined reader. This remarkable theorem, which has several times been used by other mathematicians, was the most powerful piece of topological apparatus used in the later cases of Brouwer's theory of continuous groups. It was doubtless the realization that a new proof was needed that held back his third communication on the subject.
Schoenflies regarded as his crowning achievement in plane set-theory the proof of the 'invariance of the closed curve': if a (bounded) continuum K is the common boundary of two domains in the plane so is any homeomorph of K in the plane. This proof had been broken down by Brouwer, but worse than this, his examples, which showed that two points of a
* A transformation is a homeomorphism of the plane on to itself. f Open i-cells closed in R2.
continuum K may fail to be joined by any path in seemed to remove all hopes of finding a valid proof.
Brouwer also regarded this theorem as a supreme challenge. The proof of it was the subject of his last major mathematical paper, which, he said "has as its object the filling of the remaining gap in the Schoenflies theory of the geometrical invariants ( gestaltlicheInvarianten) of plane sets o which I have referred on another occasion' (i.e. in (14)).
The theorem is proved by Brouwer in the more general form:
I f K is a [bounded.) continuum in R2 a ndf an embedding into K and have the same cardinal number of residual domains.
So generalized it becomes the harder part of the Alexander Duality Theorem for the case n -2, and for a general continuum.* Since the edges joining the vertices of approximating polygons cannot be pushed down on to K, Brouwer had the bold idea of not filling them in at all. He worked with 'abstract' 1-chains, finite sequences of points (vertices),! which are e-chains if the distance between adjacent vertices is less than e. K possesses an h-fold basis of cyclosis if there are for every e and > 0 h e-chains, Cx, . . . , Ch, on K, all beginning and en point of K, such that every e-loop (chain with the same beginning and ending) on K can be changed, as a loop, into a sum of chains C, or -C, by a finite number of e'-steps. It is an e'-step either to insert a new vertex so that the chain remains an e-chain, or to shift a vertex by less than e in K.
It is first proved that if there are a finite number, + 1, residual domains there is an h-fold basis of cyclosis. This is done by first finding e-loops and e'-steps, as just described, but in a region bounded by + 1 polygons approximating K, one in each of the residual domains, and then pushing each vertex of the whole process into the nearest point of K. If everything is small enough the steps on K are still e'-steps.
Secondly, there is no [h -\)-fold basis cyclosis on K.
Suppose there consider only the bounded residual domains, Di [i = 1, . . . , HP, is a point of D{ for each i, there is an e-loop, Ll in D{ for which P; has order 1 and P; order 0 if j i;Ll can be e'-shifted, without changing the orders, firs K, and then (by definition) into a combination of the h -1 members of a basis of cyclosis. This implies that a non-trivial sum of the h loops L{ has zero order for all the Ph which is impossible.
Since the minimal number in a basis of cyclosis is a topological invariant the theorem is proved.
This extraordinary paper, which occupies only three pages of the Annalen, packed fuller with new ideas than any other of his papers, is a fitting climax to Brouwer's mathematical work. The placing of 'abstract' e-complexes on a compact metric space, without assuming that it is possible to fill them in with Euclidean simplexes, was the basis of the method by which Vietoris * A satisfactory proof of the other p art of A lexander's Theorem , that, if a point at infinity is added, the domains are simply connected, was already available.
t The definitions are slightly modified to make this account simpler.
defined the homology groups of compact metric spaces fifteen years later (Vietoris 1927 
464). The most important difference for a reader today is that Vietoris
gives an explicit account of the underlying algebra, introducing the homology groups explicitly into topology for the first time. In Brouwer's paper some properties of polygons are taken for granted which it would be thought worth while to prove now, and which indeed follow easily by using the degree, which was already at his disposal. But it was Brouwer's practice to treat piecewise-linear matters and the related algebra as elementary, and give no proofs. This same paper, which shows so vividly his power as a mathematician, also gives warning that in the higher-dimensional topology to which he had opened the way, such an attitude would no longer be possible. In the algebraic age that was about to begin he might no longer have felt at ease. The papers that have been mentioned in this review of Brouwer's mathe matical work are only the best-known and most influential of those that he wrote between 1909 and 1913. Other papers on a variety of topological subjects appeared in a steady stream in the Amsterdam Proceedings and the Mathematische Annalen. Some of the most important remained isolated be cause it was not possible to carry them further at that time.
The papers (9b, 1912) and (54, 1920) on homotopy classes of mappings pose in dimension 2 exactly the question that was later to give the main impetus to homotopy theory. The first paper contains a proof that any two maps of S2 into itself with the same degree are homotopic, and the second extends the theory to some other pairs of surfaces.
In the paper (13, 1910) he showed that the Cantor set can carry a con tinuous group structure, the first example of a topological group which is not a Lie group. This example became widely known, and the knowledge of its existence influenced the early development of the theory of topological groups.
After the first World W ar Brouwer's interest was shifting to philosophy, and, apart from some intuitionistic adaptations the mathematical papers came to an end in the mid-twenties.
It would be difficult to find in the work of any mathematician a parallel to the sudden blaze of activity in the four years 1909 to 1913, distinguished not only by the startling originality of his ideas but by his insight into what was and what was not possible in the unknown territory of ^-dimensional topology. This grasp of the lie of the land in a new subject usually requires a pause in development, which he seemed able to do without. Once he had finally shaken off the habits of the point-set topology of his earliest days he rarely made a mistake. Very little that he did after 1909 needed revision, and much of it is still presented in the terms in which he expressed it. Although his active mathematical life was short its influence is felt in every branch of topology today.
P a r t III. F o u n d a t i o n s o f m a t h e m a t ic s
Because of his technical knowledge the working mathematician generally has a more concrete idea of foundational problems than the 'educated outsider'. Just because of this he almost inevitably asks too soon what founda tions can do for him, a typical reaction of the practical man vis-a-vis any fundamental theory in his own field of study. Popular accounts, including those of Brouwer on his own contributions, tend to over-dramatize the role of fundamental theory, and only add to the difficulty. Above all, the mathe matician should remember that his familiar experience is generally more reliable than fundamental, that is, in the present case, logical theory; except very occasionally, the latter does not correct dramatic errors of ordinary ideas (in fact, being more precise than these ideas it is more liable to be erroneous). More generally, a new fundamental theory rarely changes the way we actually see the world; in particular, logic does not change the way we think of the integers, ordered pairs and other familiar concepts. In all sciences the bulk of day-to-day work requires the introduction of ideas which, though generally consistent with fundamental theory, are independent of it; in mathematics, these ideas are defined in terms of already current concepts and therefore logically dependent on the latter. W hat the working mathematician can expect to find is that some previously inaccessible area of experience becomes manageable by means of the new theory; at least in an 'abstract' subject like mathematics the area will almost inevitably be marginal because research tends to neglect unmanageable areas. Above all, the new theory can be expected to give a sensible analysis and solution to broad general questions, such as fundamental physical theory gives to the question: 'What is m atter?' While such achievements dominate the out sider's impression of the subject they are not uppermost in the minds of working scientists. Once a theoretical idea has been introduced the scientist uses it without going back to the considerations which led to its discovery, particularly if these considerations had a recondite philosophical character. It will be best if the reader follows the account of Brouwer's work in a relaxed, detached spirit.
Constructivity on an elementary level
It is easy to recognize the difference between the kind of mathematics of which old-fashioned school mathematics is typical, and, for instance, the e-8 methods in analysis. (A precise formulation of the difference is an object of research here, not its starting point.) A striking feature of the former is the very limited use of logic: one has variables, in the first place for integers or rational numbers, symbols for computation rules (or 'functions' in the old-fashioned sense), and considers equations built up from these symbols. The proofs are limited to two kinds:
(i) recognizing that the computation rules are 'well-defined' for the arguments considered, for instance, addition or multiplication in the case of the integers;
(ii) the deduction process itself which consists in mere substitution and, in the case of arithmetic, in induction.
Thus, modulo (i), every proof is, in an obvious sense, a schema for compu tations. A general proposition such as an identity containing variables, is unambiguously about computations of particular cases (obtained by substi tuting numerals for the variables in the identity). The restriction to numerical variables is by no means essential, as shown by the following example also considered by Brouwer (80) .
Zeros of polynomials zn + aiZn~1
an with complex coefficients Approximations £ /^(l ^ i^ n)to t | £i -£ip) I < 2~p can be computed from suitable approximations to the coefficients. (In modern terms: the zeros are continuous functions of the coefficients for the usual topology of the complex plane.) The coefficients need not be given by a rule and certainly need not be rational; the compu tation applies also if, for instance, aj = + where qj is an integer and the ajr, for r = 1,2,..., are given by a random sequence of 0 (Brouwer called such sequences freely c ; reasons for h considered at the end of this Memoir.) Given qj(\ ^.j ^ n), Brouwer deter mines effectively r(p) such that can be computed from a;>[l ^7 n, 1 ^ r^ r(/>)]. In contrast, we have the case of:
Real zeros of polynomials with real coefficients (In modern terms: the existence of a real zero does not depend con tinuously on the coefficients.) We consider + in the neighbourhood of a == 0. If a z= Etf,2_r(tfr = 0 or ar = 1) there is a real zero Vr(«r = 0). Quite naively, given a rule for computing the sequence of s there is no reason why one should be able to decide Vr(ar = 0). In the case of random sequences the situation is a little more delicate; by the nature of the case only a finite number of elements ai, . . ., a" of the sequence are available for any computation, and so Vr(ar = 0), and hence the existence of a real zero of z 2 + a for the a above, could never be proved; n could not be sure that, for some r, ar 0 either. To avo which will, however, be taken up immediately, consider a = where br = 1,0 or -1. It cannot be excluded that the random sequence . . . consists only of 0; if all the available values , say ^ are 0, a can be > 0, for instance if bR +1 = 1 and bR+a ^ 0 and a can be ^0 , for in if bR+l = -1; in the former case z?-\-a has no real zero, in the latter it does. This applies to all R ('however large' as one says). Thus, even on a quite elementary understanding of the issue it is clear that there is no general method for deciding whether a polynomial with coefficients of the kind considered has real zeros.
Brouwer used a related, but slightly simpler, example to refute the law of the excluded middle for his interpretation of the logical operations. Let s be a variable for a random sequence (si, s2, . . .) of 0 and 1, write A for 3n(s" = 0) and consider A or not A, also written hence 3«(.y" = 0)
V fm(sm = 1) and so 3n\/m(s" = 0 v have a general method, say v, to compute n from s. But the value v(j) of v applied to s can depend only on a finite initial segment Si, of the sequences since this is all that is ever available for a computation. But there can be no such v ;f or if r(l) = n0, where i is the sequence consist of 1, and v(i) depends on the first p0 elements of i, we get a contradiction by taking the sequence s where s" = 1 for n ^ otherwise. This is a refutation of the general law of the excluded middle, since it is meaningful to ask for constructive operations on random sequences, as shown by the example on complex zeros.
These matters are so simple that it is a little hard to remember why they created excitement; even if one allows for exaggerations to make an impres sion (see p. 43) and for people's habit to attach great significance to their own oversights. But quite objectively, the example corrects a widely current misstatement. When the e-S machinery was introduced into analysis, it was said to have reduced the subject to operations on finite or rational approxi mations to real numbers. The example on real zeros shows that, in the strict natural sense of the word, knowledge of such approximations is not sufficient to follow up the operations actually occurring in analysis. Put more techni cally, the reduction provided by the e-S formalism does not eliminate the abstract functions involved in the familiar logical operations (but absent from oldfashioned school mathematics). Whatever one may think of these functions, their essential role in this reduction was not emphasized.
Constructive logic
What, then, is one to think of these functions (logical operations) ? Brouwer himself rejected them and, in particular, the natural justification of the law of the excluded middle. To justify the application of this law considered above, we should simply add: For any sequence s, 3n(s" -0) is well defined, true or false; this has nothing to do with whether we know how to make the decision.
Brouwer criticized this justification, claiming that a (false) analogy with the finite case is used; for instance, he would accept the argument if (3w ^.n 0)(s" -0) were substituted for 3n(j" = 0 ) . Actually his criticism involves a petitio principii because the essential point here is whether, when such an nQ is given, we apply the law of the excluded middle because we imagine a process of listing the s"for Granted that such a process is possible in principle, if we do not actually do what is possible, the actual evidence for our conclusion is elsewhere, and the same evidence may justify the general law too.
If the justification above is accepted, one also accepts the fact that some mathematics is about situations independent of ourselves. (Or, a little more cautiously, some mathematics concerns concepts about situations which we conceive as being independent of ourselves.) But there still remains the legitimate problem of developing that part of mathematics which is, so to speak hereditarily, about our own constructions and effective decisions; not as a series of ad hoc remarks, as in current number theory, pointing out that this or that proof is effective, but as a systematic theory, explaining, for instance, why certain prima facie non-constructive proofs 'happen' to be effective.
The straightforward way would be to go back to the elementary kind of constructivity described above, and to avoid logical operations altogether which, as we have just seen, are naturally interpreted in a non-constructive manner. Brouwer had the much more original idea of giving a constructive reinterpretation of the logical operations. Actually he himself never formu lated the interpretation explicitly; this was done by Heyting (p. 44). But it may fairly be said that the meaning given to the logical operations is uniquely determined by Brouwer's indications if one wants to give such a meaning at all. The cases of implication and negation are typical. Naturally, since our knowledge is involved we think of ; to prove A B, one needs two things: a mapping rr from proofs to proofs, and a proof, say pQ , establishing that, i f any p proves A then 7 proves B ; to prove -7A, we need a proof, say p i, of the assertion: for any p, p does not prove A; variable p ranges over the objects of constructive mathematics. Clearly, this explanation is non-circular only if . . . then . . .' and ' ' applied to statements of the special form 'p proves ' are essentially simpler than when applied to arbitrary propositions. (One condition is that, for any p and A, we can decide whether or not p proves A, while in general we cannot decide A ; this condition is reasonable because if we do not recognize p as a proof, it isn't one-for us.) Quite early in his work (78) , Brouwer noted the general validity of A-> -7 -7 A, -7A taking Av -7 A for B, (-7 -? B) B cannot be generally valid. Thus, for Brouwer's interpretation we have to understand proofs and constructions involving proofs, while in 'elementary' constructivity we only have to understand proofs of the special kind of proposition asserting that a given rule terminates. Perhaps, on closer analysis, we shouldn't be doing mathematics at all if we really didn't understand Brouwer's interpretation. But in the present state of knowledge it is easier to give an explicit theory for elementary constructivity.
Mathematical practice is full of examples of elementary constructivity even if nowadays they are not singled out systematically. In contrast, at least at first sight, there seems to be nothing recondite to say about construc tions on proofs in general! O f course, Heyting's formal laws, mentioned on p. 44, implicitly state properties of proofs since they are valid for Brouwer's interpretation (which is stated in terms of proofs). But so poor was people's general judgement of the situation that it came as a great surprise when Godel showed that a rich part of mathematics could be developed from these laws, incidentally by essential use of implication or negation (Godel 1933) .
Perhaps because of all this experience or for intrinsic reasons, nobody seems ever to have been as much as tempted to put down false principles in elementary constructivity. In contrast, if one actually wants to formulate explicit properties of proofs, one has to keep one's wits about one to avoid errors which are, formally, similar to Russell's paradox in set theory. This is not surprising, inasmuch as Russell's paradox involves some kind of self application and, as seen from the example of implication, proofs obviously are about themselves, specifically the proof is involved in some values of the variable p. (Incidentally, it is one of the peculiarities of constructive logic that, for some A, a natural formal proof of A goes p and of ( A ->■ B)A: such a proof of A actually contains a proof of The last two paragraphs give an idea of the problems mentioned in Part I (p. 44). They are not solved. But what we know already in this area is a substantial contribution to foundations. Also from a purely formal point of view, Heyting's systems, which were derived from Brouwer's interpretation, are remarkably interesting objects.
Infinite proofs
Naturally, further progress depends to a large extent on clearer knowledge of possible proofs of a proposition A : the more we know about such proofs, the better a chance we have to establish
Brouwer himself peppered his publications with words that suggest interesting directions of research, such as 'fully analysed' or 'canonical' proofs, and, at least implicitly, 'irredundant' proofs. Though working in the context of formal systems, Gentzen (Gentzen 1934) , who was familiar with Brouwer's ideas, may well have had these ideas in mind when he developed his important analysis of umweglose, schnittfreieA bleitungen (derivations without detour, without cut), which dominate current proof theory. But perhaps the most striking idea was Brouwer's insistence that proofs, that is the mental acts involved in establishing a general mathematical proposition, should be analysed as a transfinite sequence of steps. This is natural enough, if we remember how each of us first convinced himself at school of the validity of the principle of induction: infer f n A ( n) if T(0) and ->ff(«4-l)] are pro put differently (if we are accustomed to think of formal systems), ifwe remem ber how we convinced ourselves that the corresponding formal rule expresses a valid principle of inference.
Brouwer himself published a proposed analysis of possible proofs only for one kind of proposition; somewhat paradoxically, for a kind that also occurs in elementary constructivity, namely for propositions asserting that a rule is well defined for random sequences. By the fundamental continuity requirement the rule p must operate on finite initial segme say sn, of 5-. Thus (91) . Two corollaries follow unquestionably from his conclusion.
For sequences s taking a bounded number of values, p is uniformly con tinuous (pointwise continuity was assumed from the start).
Generally he derived the bar theorem which is another way of saying that Both conclusions are, formally, familiar enough from ordinary mathe matics, the first being an immediate consequence of compactness. Why did Brouwer have to introduce sophisticated ideas ? A glance at the usual proofs of these conclusions shows that the methods are patently non-constructive. It is a commonplace that a generalization of a theorem, that is formally the same statement interpreted for a wider class of structures, may require a much more sophisticated proof; the analogue applies if the theorem is to be constructively valid.
There may be doubt about Brouwer's doctrine on the form of canonical proofs of (i); at least a closer analysis should be possible. But even at the present stage the doctrine has served a very real purpose in explaining why the operations that happen to turn up in elementary constructivity are uniformly continuous (without uniformity being explictly required): for all constructive methods of proof so far formulated, proofs of (i) can, demon strably, be brought to Brouwer's normal form.
Hilbert's formalist foundations
This subject is not only interesting for its important role in Brouwer's scientific life, but also for the objective issues involved. The two principal elements of Hilbert's scheme are the discovery of , which had been established by massive case studies, and Hilbert's own formulation (in the language of combinatorial mathematics, which is a quite narrow part of elementary constructive mathematics) of the autonomy of combinatorial mathematics. What he aimed to show was that the abstract elements, in parti cular the logical operations of non-constructive mathematics, and the opera tions on proofs in Brouwer's interpretation, are not needed for establishing combinatorial theorems. Hilbert's idea was very much the same as the widely current idea that an arithmetic theorem must have an arithmetic proof or even that a 'simple' statement, if it can be proved at all, must have a simple proof. (It should, however, be noted here that Hilbert, in contrast to Brouwer, believed that non-constructive notions were needed to make mathematics intelligible.)
A little more explicitly, Hilbert's scheme may be described as follows. Examination of mathematical practice, in particular the reduction to set theory by Whitehead and Russell, provided a formal system F in which ordinary mathematical reasoning can be described compactly. (The formal rules of F are not, contrary to some passages in Hilbert's writings, the essen tials of mathematical reasoning; it is not enough to manipulate the formal rules of F, but one must recognize that they are valid for their intended meaning.) To explain how usual elementary combinatorial mathematics can be 'developed' in F, let PF(c, n) mean that the sequence of formulae c is a formal derivation in Fo f n; the proper systems, is quite elementary. Now to each elementary assertion (identity) JV, possibly containing variables, is associated a formula of which, for the intended meaning of F, expresses that is true. The function a such that, for the JV considered, JV -> n) holds (when JV contains no variables and a slightly more complicated form if it does). This last statement no longer refers to the interpretation of F. Finally, to show that the development is sound, we must show that, for any P F ( c , n) JV is valid, that is, even if is formally derived using abs arguments reflected in c, JV must be true. This last formula, too, is expressed in wholly elementary terms and so there is at least the possibility of an elementary proof. (If one had such a proof, and ca is a derivation of n in F, one would also have an elementary proof of JV.) Being sure that he would find one, for reasonable F, Hilbert, of course, did not expect to have to analyse the idea of elementary proof: he'd recognize one when he saw it.
Originally for purely technical reasons, Hilbert observed that n) -> JV holds if we can establish the formal consistency of that is if we can show that, for any c: not PF(c, n0 ) where n0 is the formula of F exp (Hilbert's observation uses in an essential way that combinatorial arith metic can be developed in F in the sense explained above.)
The Hilbert-Brouwer controversy can nowadays be put very simply. As time went on Hilbert tried to give a much more central significance to consistency; as if it were the only thing that mattered, and not merely that it was sufficient for what was called above the autonomy of elementary mathematics. But suppose F is such that, for some true identity JV, the corresponding n is not derivable in F; then the system obtained from F by adding the formal negation of n is consistent. Thus a patently false statement is derivable in the extended system, namely the negation of N. Brouwer's main criticism of Hilbert concerned this kind of inadequacy of the consistency criterion, he never attacked directly the principal claim of the autonomy of combina torial mathematics. But, in contrast to Hilbert, his judgement on the matter was sound: he didn't believe the autonomy. (Though Hilbert never expli citly said so, the only really convincing proof of his programme would have been to show, independently of any particular system , that any combina torial statement can either be proved by combinatorial methods or refuted. Even without closer analysis of the notion of combinatorial proof, this last conjecture is very implausible in view of Godel's incompleteness theorems.)
There is a natural modification of Hilbert's project, to prove PF{c, n) N not necessarily by combinatorial methods but by other suitable constructive methods. The principles discovered and developed by Brouwer dominate in this work.
Luitzen Egbertus J a n Brouwer61
Ideal mathematician
In connexion with a specific problem on random sequences, the proof of -r
Ws[ -7 -y 3 n(s" = 0) -*■ 3 n(s" = 0)] in the notation considered in (102) the case of a 'thinking subject' or 'ideal mathematician' 2 proving theorems in stages 1,2, ... in order co. Much of this is dubious as will be seen below; besides we have nowadays better ways of dealing with his specific problem. But a few, interesting points are quite clear.
Let \-"A mean that 2 has proved A by stage n. For each n, 2 knows if he has proved A or if he has not. So (h"i4)v -7 (h*4), and 2 has a well-defined rule r with values 0 or 1, such that V«[r(w) = 1 (l-"4)]. If h " At hen A (whether 'A ' means that 2 has already a proof of A or will have a proof or that somebody has a proof!).
A -r -7 3n{YnA)(if somebody has a proof there is no mathematical reason why 2 should not have one; for the other meanings even A -> 3n(Vn A) can be asserted), and hence -7
A-7 3n(YnA). These conditions are clearly sufficient to conclude 3r(V«[r(«) = 0] <->-^4). This last statement no longer contains the relation h" and Vw[r(w) = 0] < -► -is the property R (of r) mentioned in Part I, p. 45. The proposition A is quite arbitrary: if propositions containing quantifiers over rules are included the axiom above implies quite a strong form of comprehension principle. Once again, as in the case of the bar t h e o r e m , we find a familiar form with a quite different justification.
The whole idea has a certain air of unreality, of playing with words. This impression is justified in so far as it is not clear what is meant by a 'stage' or whether the mathematician is supposed to prove one or infinitely many theorems at stage n\ also there is no clear reason to restrict oneself to a stages when the canonical proofs on p. 59 consist of a transfinite sequence. But probably the actual reason behind the impression is that the argument is too 'easy'; that to get 'real' knowledge of mathematical reason ing one should study (it would be said) the physics and chemistry of the nervous system instead of the ideal mathematician. This is no more convincing than having the founders of hydrodynamics study the atomic structure of matter before setting down equations of continuity and other properties of ideal fluids', equations which give detailed quantitative results derived from quite general qualitative assumptions about, that is from impressions of, the world. Indeed, even after one knows atomic theory one rarely uses it to understand the motion of fluids around us. Similarly, there is at present no reason to reject the possibility of a useful mathematical theory of the ideal mathematician.
Looking back (in the light of what was said about the function of funda mental theories at the beginning of Part III). Certainly if one wants to know at all about the constructive aspects of mathematics, Brouwer's work has been invaluable. Instead of bits and pieces of isolated 'constructivizations' one has a more or less coherent theory, made systematic by a suitably abstract conception of constructive operations. Particularly in connexion with the principles of proof and definition by transfinite induction, Brouwer's constructive logic explains why formally minor variants completely alter the constructive aspects. Not surprisingly, Heyting's formal rules have interesting applications beyond the intended one. Roughly speaking, when ever mathematicians loosely speak of 'constructions', for instance, if they mean no more than some kind of explicit definition, there is a reason for their informal choice of words; the 'logic' of their concepts, as one says, is the logic of constructions in the proper sense of the word; they satisfy Heyting's rules. This is consistent with the-remark on p. 44 , that these rules use only very simple properties of the notion of construction in its strict sense. Many examples of such pseudo-constructions are provided by recent definitions of models in set theory following P. J. Cohen's proof of the formal independence of the continuum hypothesis.
Is mathematics about our own constructions or is it about an external reality?
It would have been idle to go into the ambiguities referred to on p. 40, before analysing and developing the part of mathematics which about our own constructions. But since, largely through the work of Brouwer, substantial progress has been made in this subject, it is now worth while to go into some distinctions. First of all, some mathematics treats concepts which quite plainly are intended to be about an external reality, about sets and random sequences given, for example, by throwing dice. (Only if one thinks of them as sequences freely chosen by a 'thinking' subject are they possibly our own constructions.) Inasmuch as we understand these concepts and can reason about them, not all mathematics is about concepts which refer, hereditarily, to our own constructions. It is not relevant here whether an actual reality is involved or possibilities. Second, since mathematics is constantly used in the description of nature, it would be splitting hairs to deny that a good deal of mathematics is also about actual external reality; not only finite mathematics used in stating results of measurements but the highly abstract concepts used in formulating theoretical laws which connect such measurements. But a real issue remains:
Can the mathematics that presents itself to us as being about an external reality be construed as being about our own constructions or, as one says, can it be 'accounted for' in terms of our own constructions ?
Here the answer is negative, at the present stage of the development of constructive mathematics, if one means all principles of non-constructive mathematics so far j formulated.For example, we do not have a constructiv consistency proof for the formal principles of analysis, and this would be a minimum requirement for a positive answer, since those principles are evidently valid for the (non-constructive) concepts of the set of natural numbers and of its power set.
On the other hand, at the present stage of the development of ordinary mathematics, the bulk of mathematical practice can indeed be construed constructively, if Brouwer's bar theorem is included in the latter. Actual practice uses nothing like all the principles of non-constructive mathematics so far formulated. Naturally the interpretation is not on a purely formal level but the difference in meaning between the constructive and non-constructive logical operations must be taken into account.
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